Battle Of The Wilderness Essay Research Paper free essay sample

Battle Of The Wilderness Essay, Research Paper The Battle of the Wilderness Imagine, wrote a North Carolina officer named W.A. Smith, a great, blue forest containing. . . the worst sort of brush of second-growth trees. . . so thick with little pines and scrub oak, cedar, cornel and other growing common to the state. . . [ that ] one could see hardly 10 gaits ( qtd. in Kennedy 203 ) . This description is of the country known as the Wilderness, where over 135 old ages ago, one of the greatest Civil War conflicts occurred. The Battle of the Wilderness was the beginning of the terminal for the Confederate States of America. The part called the Wilderness is in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, merely 10 stat mis west of Fredericksburg. It is a natural wooded country that is 12 stat mis broad and six stat mis deep along the southern bank of the Rapidan River. The Wilderness was described by Lieutenant Thomas F. Galwey of the 8th Ohio as a wild and formidable brush, so heavy that even at midday twenty-four hours the Sun s visible radiation barely penetrated it ( qtd. We will write a custom essay sample on Battle Of The Wilderness Essay Research Paper or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page in Trudeau 44 ) . In the early 1700 s, Alexander Spotswood, Virginia s governor during the clip, tried to populate the Wilderness. He brought over German settlers to make so. They cut big sums of lumber from the wood to procure the mine tunnels, plank the roads, and fuel the iron-smelting operations. But when the program failed and the country was abandoned, the forest grew back really rapidly, making a second-growth forest ( Kennedy 203 ) . On May 5 and 6, 1864, two ground forcess, the Army of the Potomac of the Union and the Army of Northern Virginia from the Confederate States of America, engaged in a barbarous conflict known as the Battle of the Wilderness. The conflict included over 160,000 work forces, with around 100,000 coming from the Union and near to 62,000 from the Confederacy ( Wilderness ) . Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General George G. Meade led the Union s Army of the Potomac, and General Robert E. Lee commanded the Confederacy s Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of the Potomac was commanded by Major General George G. Meade, who received his orders from Lieutenant General Grant. Allow made his central offices in the field with the ground forces to guarantee his orders were followed right. The Union ground forces consisted of three corps and an independent corps commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside, who outranked Meade and reported straight to Grant ( Graham and Skoch 68 ) . The II Corps was led by Major General Winfield S. Hancock, the V Corps by Major General Gouverneur Warren, and the VI Corps by Major General John Sedgwick. The Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, consisted of three corps. The First Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet. The Second Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell. The Third Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General A. P. Hill. Part of Grant s expansive program was to travel rapidly to the South through the Wilderness before the Confederates reacted. The Wilderness posed a serious menace of an ambuscade that could do a terrible reverse to the Union s run. Grant knew that a conflict in an unfastened field would be a certain triumph for his ground forces over Lee s out-numbered Army of Northern Virginia ( Trudeau 44 ) . All Grant s army needed was a half-day caput start on Lee s ground forces to cross the Rapidan River and derive the advantage ( Davis 197 ) . Even though he was outnumbered about two to one, Lee possessed a few advantages, chiefly his place South of the Rapidan River. The Army of the Potomac had to traverse this river to acquire to him. Besides, General Lee knew the land better than his oppositions, Grant and Meade. However, his greatest advantage was the impenetrable flora of the Wilderness. Lee believed he could utilize the wood to keep off twice the figure of his work forces ( Davis 197 ) . The Union began its motion into the Wilderness early on May 4, 1864, when it separated into two columns and headed to fords a few stat mis apart, at which they crossed the Rapidan River and entered the Wilderness. The V and VI Corps crossed the river at Germanna Ford Road. Hancock s II Corps and the Union ground forces supply train crossed the river at Ely s Ford to cantonment at near-by Chancellorsville. Grant ordered Burnside to halt buttocks and guard the railway North of Rappahannock Station from Confederate plunderers. After he was across, Grant sent a message to the War Department in Washington. The crossing of the Rapidan effected, he wrote. Forty-eight hours now will show whether the enemy intends giving conflict this side of Richmond ( qtd in Graham and Skoch 68 ) . Besides, after his crossing, Grant learned of Lee s purposes. A Confederate message for Lieutenant General Ewell had been intercepted and translated to We are traveling ( Graham and Skoch 68 ) . Around mid-morning on May 4, Lee learned of the Union motion and without cognizing of Grant s programs, he moved his three corps toward the Wilderness on different paths. Ewell s Second Corps was directed to process on the Orange Turnpike and A. P. Hill s Third Corps to process on the Orange Plank Road, analogue and South of Ewell. Longstreet s First Corps, who was a twenty-four hours behind the other two, was directed to take the Catharpin Road to Todd s Tavern. During the dark, Hancock was ordered to travel his II Corps South to organize the left wing of the Union line. When everyone was in Li ne, the ground forces moved at first visible radiation on May 5. To protect the right wing, Warren sent a division West on the Orange Turnpike. The Union plans to unclutter the Wilderness were so disrupted when Warren s V Corps spotted Ewell s work forces coming toward them. After larning of the Confederate military personnels on the Orange Turnpike, Meade ordered Warren to concentrate his work forces on the turnpike and onslaught every bit shortly as possible. Besides, Meade ordered Sedgwick s VI Corps to the turnpike to guard the right wing. Grant sent orders to concentrate his three corps along a line between the turnpike and Orange Plank Road with great importance put on the Brock Rd.-Orange Plank Rd. intersection. If the Confederates gained this intersection, the II Corps would be cut off from the remainder of the ground forces. The first combat began early in the afternoon on May 5 between Warren s V Corps and Ewell s Second Corps on the Orange Turnpike and in a little glade known as Saunders Field. The contending moved easy south as more units came to the line. The Union Corps had the beginning additions, but they were pushed back by the countermoves of the Confederates. Even after Sedgwicks VI Corps joined Warren s work forces in the late afternoon, no advantages were gained by either side. To the South, A.P. Hill was less successful. A little figure of Union horse delayed Hill s motion east long plenty for a Union division to take over the of import intersection of Orange Plank and Brock roads. Subsequently in the afternoon, Hancock s II Corps arrived and launched an uncoordinated but powerful onslaught that was eventually stopped by the usage of every modesty available to the Confederates. By nightfall, the northern half of the Confederate line was injured but solid, and the southern half was scattered, tired, and ill-prepared for what would come. General Lee did non desire to contend a big conflict with lone two-thirds of his ground forces, so he downplayed the job ( Kennedy 205 ) . Around midnight, he refused A.P. Hill s request to reorganize by giving him the alibi that Longstreet s First Corps would get in clip to take the force per unit area off of his work forces. The forenoon of May 6 came, but Longstreet did non. Allow ordered his ground forces to assail at first visible radiation. The Union onslaughts of the Orange Turnpike were uneffective because of strong Confederate defences. To the South, Union forces saw some success, but it did non last long. Merely when the Confederate right wing appeared defeated, Longstreet s First Corps arrived. Their brutal countermove surprised the Union aggressors and sent them into a deadlock. The strength of Longstreet s reaching was strengthened when Lee, himself, take the counterstriking units across the unfastened Fieldss of the Tapp Farm. The calls of Lee to the rear made this one of the most memorable episodes of conflict ( Kennedy 205 ) . Early on in the eventide, an full-scale Confederate offense raged over both wings of the Union line. The onslaught in the Fieldss along the Orange Plank Road was stopped at the Brock Road line. To the North, Confederate Brigadier General John B. Gordon led his work forces to an assault on the Union right wing. He was successful, but his additions were overseen by nightfall and the involuntariness of the field commanding officer, Major General Jubal Early, to imperativeness forward. Late in the afternoon, Major General Longstreet was hit. He and his work forces were traveling around the Union left flank when shootings came from the forests. The shooting hit Longstreet in his pharynx and went into his shoulder, doing terrible hemorrhage. This hurt took Longstreet off of his bid and into bed for several hebdomads. The heavy combat in the Wilderness costed both ground forcess near to 30,000 casualties. The Army of the Potomac had close to 18,000 casualties, where as the Army of Northern Virginia s casualties were estimated around 11,000. Many wounded soldiers were burned to decease after the prohibitionist underbrush caught on fire and spreaded really rapidly. A northern private wrote that it was a blind and bloody Hunt to the decease, in perplexing brushs, instead than a conflict ( qtd in Kennedy 206 ) . It is estimated that 200 Union work forces died in the fire ( Hansen 511 ) . The Wilderness Battlefield is now portion of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park. The country is on State Route 3, West of Fredericksburg, Virginia. There are 1,981 estates of this historic battleground within the boundaries of the park, 212 of these are in private owned ( Kennedy 205 ) . During the May 5 and 6 conflict in the Wilderness, about full force of both ground forcess were engaged. With both sides holding heavy losingss, neither could name this a triumph, even though the Battle of the Wilderness marked the beginning of the terminal for the Army of Northern Virginia and for the Confederacy itself. Plants Cited Davis, William C. The Battlefields of the Civil War. New York: Smithmark Publishers, 1991: 195-211. Graham, Martin and George Skoch. Great Battles of the Civil War. New York: Beekman House, n.d. : 66-70. Hansen, Harry. The Civil War A History. New York: Penguin Books, 1961: 505-512. Kennedy, Frances H. , erectile dysfunction. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1990: 203-206. Trudeau, Noah Andre. A Atrocious and Frightening Place. Civil War Times May 1999: 43-55. Wilderness. Online. Internet. 5-6-99. Available hypertext transfer protocol: //www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va046.htm